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OPINION OF THE COURT
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BARRY, Circuit Judge
I. Introduction
We have approached this case with the utmost
seriousness. We are humbled by the fact that over a twentyeight-year period of time, the case has progressed through
courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the U.S.
District Court without James Lambert having been granted
relief. We, nonetheless, must decide this case consistent with
what we believe our obligation to be, while according the
utmost respect to the standard of review that we are required
to apply. Having done so, we now vacate the judgment of the
District Court dated July 24, 2007, and remand this matter to
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the District Court, which is directed to conditionally grant the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. If, within 120 days of the
date of this Opinion and Order, the Commonwealth fails to
retry Mr. Lambert, he shall be released. 1
II. Procedural History
It is not an overstatement to say that the procedural
history of this case is extensive in the extreme, as would be
expected in a case that has spanned more than twenty-eight
years. We have carefully examined the numerous issues
Lambert has raised over these many years and how the
various courts have resolved those issues. We, however,
decide this case on one issue, an issue under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and find it unnecessary to
address the other issues raised to us or the issues raised to the
courts that preceded us. So, too, only a summary of the
procedural history that does not pertain to the Brady issue
will suffice.
James Lambert and Bruce Reese were arrested and
charged with murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and
possession of an instrument of crime based on what the
Commonwealth had been told by one Bernard Jackson, who
subsequently testified for the Commonwealth in exchange for
an open guilty plea to third-degree murder, robbery,
conspiracy, and several unrelated crimes. On April 25, 1984,
Lambert was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree
murder as well as the other crimes with which he was
charged, and was sentenced to death. Reese was convicted of
second-degree murder, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.

1

Given this disposition, our order of November 23, 2010,
which vacated the sentence of death given our conclusion that
the jury instructions violated Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988), is now moot and will be vacated, and the
Commonwealth’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing
en banc as to that order will be denied as moot.
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Lambert moved for a new trial and to vacate the
judgment, motions which were denied. He appealed, and in a
3-2 decision with two Justices not participating, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld his conviction and
affirmed the sentence of death. See Commonwealth v.
Lambert, 603 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1992) (“Lambert I”). Lambert
next filed a pro se Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”) petition, which was amended by counsel on
January 30, 1997, and twice supplemented thereafter. On
January 29, 1998, the PCRA court denied the petition without
a hearing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded for
the PCRA court to write an opinion, which it did on March 4,
2000.
Lambert again appealed, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion signed by two Justices,
with two Justices concurring in the opinion, one concurring in
the result, and two dissenting. See Commonwealth v.
Lambert, 797 A.2d 232 (Pa. 2001) (“Lambert II”). Lambert
then filed a second PCRA petition raising, for the first time, a
claim under Brady, based on recently discovered exculpatory
evidence. That petition was denied as well, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court again affirmed.
See
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848 (Pa. 2005)
(“Lambert III”).
In 2002, Lambert filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania raising twenty-four claims of
constitutional error, most of which were accompanied by
related allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 The
District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing and
denied relief on all claims, but granted a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) on one guilt-phase claim relating to
the Commonwealth’s alleged discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges at jury selection in violation of Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and one sentencing-phase
claim relating to whether there had been a violation of Mills
2

Lambert’s habeas petition was stayed pending exhaustion
of the claims raised in that petition in his subsequently filed
third PCRA petition.
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v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). See Lambert v. Beard,
No. 02-9034, 2007 WL 2173390 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2007).
We then expanded the COA to include the following
issues: (1) whether the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence and misrepresentation of the bargain
given to its key witness in exchange for his testimony
violated Brady; (2) whether Lambert was denied his right to
present a defense, call witnesses on his behalf, and confront
the evidence against him when he was barred from
introducing evidence that Jackson and Reese had a history of
committing robberies together and without him; (3) whether
Lambert was denied his right to due process and a fair trial
when the trial court allowed a witness called by Reese to
identify Lambert for the first time in court; (4) whether
Lambert was denied his right to due process when the trial
court refused to sever his trial from Reese’s trial; (5) whether
the trial court misled the jury about the role of appellate
review in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985); and (6) whether Lambert’s penalty-phase waiver of
his right to present mitigating evidence was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 2241, and 2254. We have appellate jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary review
over the decision of the District Court, as the Court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing. See Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d
223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), where, as here, a habeas petitioner’s
claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, our
review is limited to determining whether the state court
decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent or an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
5

IV. Factual Background
At approximately 9:00 on the evening of September
23, 1982, the robbery of Prince’s Lounge went bad, and two
patrons were shot to death.
The Philadelphia Police
Department commenced an investigation, but the perpetrators
could not be identified, although two of the three barmaids
working that night gave general descriptions of each of the
two perpetrators. Not long after the murders, however, an
anonymous tip was received by the Department identifying
Bernard Jackson and “Touche” (later identified as Reese,
Jackson’s brother-in-law) as the men in the bar that night.
Each barmaid was subsequently presented, for the first time,
with a photo array that included Jackson’s photo. Sarah Clark
identified Jackson as the man who was standing at the top of
the stairs in the bar and ordered her to place the money in a
bag just before she heard two gunshots from the rear of the
bar, the shots that killed the two patrons. Marie Green was 85
to 90 percent sure that the man at the top of the stairs was
Jackson. Janet Ryan, the third barmaid, was working at the
rear of the bar and dropped down and ran to the ladies room
when the shooter pointed a gun in her face.
Jackson, who by then was in custody on another
charge, learned that he had been identified by at least one of
the barmaids and told the police about the Prince’s Lounge
robbery and that Reese and “another dude,” whose name he
could not recall, had done it. His story, at least initially, went
as follows. He and Reese met the “other dude” (whom he
much later identified as Lambert) for the first time less than
an hour before the three of them decided to rob a bar. After
casing, and rejecting, one bar, Jackson, who admitted to
having previously committed at least thirteen armed robberies
of bars, made the decision to rob the Prince’s Lounge after
ascertaining that a female friend of his was not working that
night. Jackson claimed to have waited in the getaway car
while Lambert and Reese entered the bar and went upstairs,
each armed with a handgun provided by Reese – Lambert was
carrying the .32 and Reese the .38, which, as it turned out,
was the murder weapon. Jackson claimed not to have known
6

what happened in the bar aside from what he was told by
Reese and Lambert when they returned to the car and fled the
scene with Jackson at the wheel.
V. Discussion
It is undisputed that without Jackson’s statements to
the police, the Commonwealth could not have indicted
Lambert on these charges. See Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (finding evidence impeaching witness’s
credibility material, in part, because without the witness’s
testimony, “there could have been no indictment”). Jackson,
however, came burdened with a wealth of impeachment
material, not the least of which were four prior inconsistent
statements to the police about who did what and who said
what on the night in question, and his admitted goal of
testifying to save himself from a death sentence – “no doubt
about it,” he said. (A2180). Predictably, he was savaged at
trial. One wonders how the Commonwealth could have based
this case of first-degree murder on a Bernard Jackson.
But we digress.
A.
Jackson’s statements of October 14, 1982, October 22,
1982, January 14, 1983, and February 6, 1983 were
devastatingly inconsistent with each other and with his story
at trial. He initially decided to give the police only “some of
the truth” and told the police that Reese had admitted to
shooting two people (A2002); then he told the police that
Reese said Lambert was the shooter and that Reese was
ordering the barmaid to give him the money (A2007, 2013);
then he told the police that although he had previously said
that Lambert had done it, that wasn’t true – he was “feeding
them a story” when he said that Lambert said he had shot two
people and “that was a lie, too.” (A2080, 2082, 2100.) Now,
at trial, he said, he was going to tell the truth. It was Reese,
not Lambert, who said that he shot two people, but that
wasn’t true either because what Reese really said was that “I
7

think we killed a couple of guys in there,” not that he did.
(A2253.) Indeed, Jackson was finally forced to admit that
three months after the first of his lengthy statements to the
police, he was still giving them different versions of what had
happened. Still, breathtakingly, at the very end of his
testimony, with his credibility hanging, at best, by a thread,
and conceding that he was testifying to avoid a death
sentence, Jackson somewhat proudly announced that although
he had “switched what [Lambert and Reese] did
interchangeably,” he always said that Lambert and Reese
were the two men involved – they were “the only two people”
he supplied to the police. (A2266-67, 2276.)
But that was simply not so, and neither the defense nor
the jury was told that it was not so. In the Police Activity
Sheet of October 25, 1982, which first came to light during
the PCRA proceedings, Jackson named Lawrence Woodlock
as a “co-defendant.”
(A3334.)
The Commonwealth
conceded at oral argument before us that the Police Activity
Sheet should have been disclosed to the defense prior to trial.
Aside from the other arguments made as to why that Police
Activity Sheet was significant, there can be no question that
given Jackson’s consistent position – his only consistent
position, by his own admission, not to mention the evidence
at trial – that the only participants were Lambert and Reese in
the bar and Jackson in the car, the naming of another
participant could well have destroyed what little was left of
his credibility.
The PCRA Court considered whether the
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose Jackson’s statement that
there was another participant – a “co-defendant” – was
material such that, as the Supreme Court explained, “there is
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).
The PCRA Court denied Lambert’s Brady claim on the
merits, explaining that “[v]iewed in light of the record as a
whole, the [Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982] is not
material.”
(A227).
It concluded that “Jackson was
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comprehensively impeached by the defendant and codefendant Reese at trial,” and “[d]espite being impeached on
prior inconsistencies and lies to police, the jury [sic]
determined Jackson to be credible.”
(A228.)
The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, explaining that the
Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982
would not have materially furthered the
impeachment of Jackson at trial as he was
already extensively impeached by both
appellant and Reese. Indeed, each codefendant
cross-examined Jackson on the following:
every inconsistency in his four police
statements; that he was testifying on behalf of
the Commonwealth pursuant to a plea bargain;
and that he had several open robbery charges
still pending and his testimony was motivated
by a desire to receive lenient sentences for those
crimes.
Any additional impeachment of
Jackson arising from a police notation would
have been cumulative.
Accordingly, the
Commonwealth did not violate Brady by not
disclosing this police activity sheet as appellant
has failed to show its materiality.
Lambert III, 884 A.2d at 855-56. The District Court did not
mention the Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982 in its
Opinion, instead treating it as just one among the host of
other items the Commonwealth had not disclosed and
concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
disposition of Lambert’s Brady claim was a reasonable
application of federal law. See Lambert v. Beard, 2007 WL
2173390, at *10.
B.
“[O]ur duty to search for constitutional error with
painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital
case.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995) (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, AEDPA
created a “new, highly deferential standard for evaluating
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state-court rulings.” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7
(1997). That statute bars a federal court from granting habeas
relief unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “[T]he cutoff date for determining
‘clearly established Federal law’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)
is the date of the relevant state-court decision.” Greene v.
Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010).
“A state-court decision that correctly identifies the
governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of
a particular prisoner’s case certainly would qualify as a
decision involving an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
407-08 (2000) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). While the term “unreasonable” is “no doubt
difficult to define,” “the most important point is that an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 410. “Under §
2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable application clause, then, a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also
be unreasonable.” Id. at 411 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The unreasonable application test is an objective
one – a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely
because it concludes that the state court applied federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92,
100 (3d Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court has recently
explained, “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks
merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded
jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.’” Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587, slip op. at 11
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). We have with “painstaking care”
reviewed this case with this explanation in mind and have
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found constitutional error. It is our duty to correct it. See
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422.
C.
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
373 U.S at 87. The Supreme Court has clarified that material
information must be disclosed even absent a defense request,
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), and that
the Brady rule applies to impeachment evidence as well as
directly exculpatory evidence, id. at 676.
Information is material “only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 682. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A] showing of
materiality does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence
would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . .
. .” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. “The question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence
he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence.” Id.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the
Police Activity Sheet of October 25, 1982 was immaterial
because Jackson was so thoroughly impeached that, ipso
facto, additional evidence could not have made a difference.
To be sure, “impeachment evidence, if cumulative of similar
impeachment evidence used at trial . . . is superfluous and
therefore has little, if any, probative value.” Conley v. United
States, 415 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
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original); see also United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 191
(3d Cir. 2002) (finding no Brady violation where another
witness testified to the same supposedly exculpatory
information); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 251 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“When a witness’s credibility has already been
substantially called into question in the same respects by
other evidence, additional impeachment evidence will
generally be immaterial and will not provide the basis for a
Brady claim.” (emphasis added)).
Yet it is patently unreasonable to presume – without
explanation – that whenever a witness is impeached in one
manner, any other impeachment becomes immaterial. In a
similar context, the Supreme Court has rejected such an
argument. In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), a
prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony that a
cooperating government witness had not, in fact, been
promised consideration in exchange for his testimony.
Rejecting the government’s argument that the defense had
numerous other ways in which to impeach the witness, the
Court held that it “[did] not believe that the fact that the jury
was apprised of other grounds for believing that the witness . .
. may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner
turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.” Id.
at 270.
The logic of Napue has been extended to the Brady
context, both by the Supreme Court of the United States and
by various federal courts of appeals. In Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668 (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the state’s
argument that no Brady violation had occurred because the
witness “was heavily impeached at trial” and thus that his
status as a paid informant would have been “merely
cumulative.” Id. at 702 (alterations omitted). Finding that no
other impeachment evidence was “directly relevant” to the
witness’s status as an informant, the Court ruled that “one
could not plausibly deny the existence of the requisite
‘reasonable probability of a different result’ had the
suppressed information been disclosed to the defense.” Id. at
702-03. See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 689 (“If the testimony
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that might have been impeached is weak and also cumulative,
corroborative, or tangential, the failure to disclose the
impeachment evidence could conceivably be held harmless.
But when the testimony is the start and finish of the
prosecution’s case, and is weak nonetheless, quite a different
conclusion must necessarily be drawn.”).
We have also recognized that undisclosed Brady
material that would have provided a different avenue of
impeachment is material, even where the witness is otherwise
impeached. See Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387 (3d
Cir. 2004) (holding that although the defendant was able to
impeach the prosecution in certain respects, the suppressed
information was material under Brady because there was a
“significant difference” between the suppressed material and
the information to which the defense had access); United
States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1991)
(rejecting the district court finding “that the jury had an
opportunity to evaluate the informant’s credibility from other
damaging testimony” and concluding that “[w]hether or not
the jury has had an opportunity to consider other
impeachment evidence is not the correct standard for
determining materiality of undisclosed information”). But see
Lisa Michelle Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 253 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“‘Suppressed evidence is not material when it
merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a
witness whose credibility has already been shown to be
questionable.’” (further internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir.
1996))). 3
3

Unlike in Lisa Marie Lambert, the impeachment at issue
here is not simply “an additional basis on which to impeach.”
Rather, as the First Circuit has recognized, “[c]onfidence in
the outcome is particularly doubtful when the withheld
evidence impeaches a witness whose testimony is
uncorroborated and essential to the conviction.” Norton v.
Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, the withheld information provided a
unique basis on which to impeach – specifically, a basis that
13

Other federal courts of appeals have echoed the
conclusion that additional, non-cumulative impeachment
material implicates Brady. See United States v. Torres, 569
F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Merely because other
impeachment evidence was presented does not mean that
additional impeachment evidence is cumulative . . . .”);
Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“However, that the jury had other reasons to disbelieve
McLaurin does not render the suppressed evidence of the deal
immaterial.
Evidence that the prosecution promised
immunity to induce McLaurin to testify as its star witness is a
wholly different kind of impeachment evidence . . . .”);
Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The
state argues that because Trygstad was a convicted felon his
credibility already was suspect and the additional information
regarding his petition for commutation and pending hearing
thereon would not have affected the jury’s judgment as to his
truthfulness. Logic of this kind has been dismissed by the
Supreme Court.” (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 270)).
What is critical here is that the undisclosed statement
by Jackson that there was another participant – a “codefendant,” to use his word – was not just one more piece of
impeachment material to be placed in a “so what” category
because Jackson had already been so thoroughly impeached.
Rather, the undisclosed Police Activity Sheet would have
opened an entirely new line of impeachment, and would have
done far more than simply allow the defense to point out —
as it did — that Jackson was inconsistent and often changed
his story. The way we know that the undisclosed statement
would have opened a new line of impeachment is that by not
disclosing it, the prosecution was able to rely on Jackson’s
consistency in naming Reese and Lambert as the perpetrators,
the only point on which he was consistent at trial. The
Supreme Court has instructed that we may take the
Commonwealth at its word that this was important. See
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444 (“The likely damage is best understood
shredded Jackson’s credibility on the one point on which the
jury could have inferred that he had any credibility.
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by taking the word of the prosecutor, who contended during
closing arguments that Smallwood and Williams were the
State’s two best witnesses.”). Here, the prosecution’s closing
argument emphasized Jackson’s consistency in naming
Lambert and Reese as the perpetrators. (A3115.) No more,
in our view, need be said to make clear that finding that
Lambert had not met the requirements of Brady was an
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court precedent.
In closing, we cannot help but observe that the
evidence is very strong that Reese, not Lambert, was the
shooter, even assuming that Lambert (and not Jackson, as two
of the barmaids testified) was in the Prince’s Lounge that
night. First, it is undisputed that the .38 was the murder
weapon, that the .38 was Reese’s gun and carried by him that
night, and that Lambert (if he was there) had only the .32.
Second, all three barmaids described the shooter as no more
than 5’7”. Reese is 5’7”; Lambert is 6’ to 6’1”. Third, the
testimony of Janet Ryan, the barmaid who suddenly
remembered Lambert as having put the gun in her face,
identifying him on Reese’s case only “from the nose up”
(although she told the police at the time of the murders that
she “didn’t even get a look at the man”) after failing to
identify him on the Commonwealth’s case because “nobody
asked me,” was, in a word, bizarre. (A2824, 2844, 2940-41).
These examples are precisely the types of evidence which can
undermine a court’s faith that the verdict in question is
“worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Finally, and
for what it is worth (perhaps Jackson saw the havoc his
testimony had wrought), we note the post-trial proffer of
Jackson’s affidavit, in which he says that Reese was the
shooter and that Ryan was a friend of Reese’s family and
would never testify against Reese. The affidavit was rejected
by the trial court as untimely and not in proper form. See
Lambert I, 603 A.2d at 572.
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VI. Conclusion
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and this
matter is remanded. The District Court is directed to
conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Commonwealth shall retry Lambert within 120 days. If
it fails to do so, Lambert shall be released.
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